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D-DAY FOR DECISION-MAKERS: CONSIDERATIONS
FOR A NEW PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING
SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA
The principle of educational equality contrasts with the principle
of educational freedom: children and youth have the right to choose
for themselves what education they shall receive.*
I. INTrODUCTION
Sixteen years have passed since the United States Supreme Court
concluded, in Brown v. Board of Education,' that the fourteenth
amendment required equality in education for all. Although that
historical decision confined itself to abolishing segregation in the
public schools, the fourteenth amendment does not so confine itself.2
Equality is not the province of the blacks. Equality must be prac-
ticed wherever inequality looms large, regardless of race, creed, or
cause.
In August, 1971, the Supreme Court of California found that un-
equal wealth distribution in California has resulted in unequal ed-
* J. McCLELLAN, TowARD A_ EFcTVE CRITIQUE OF AmmiacAN EDUCA-
TON 311 (1968).
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 states that no state shall "... de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
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ucation in the public schools. The court in Serrano v. Priest3 held
that the California public school financing system violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. This system "...
invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the qual-
ity of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and
neighbors."
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A class action was brought by certain Los Angeles County public
school pupils and their parents on behalf of all public school child-
ren in California-except those whose educational opportunity is
superior. Plaintiff parents represented those parents whose child-
ren attend the school system attacked and who pay real property
taxes in their county of residence. The defendants were state and
county officials charged with the administration of the California
system for financing public schools.5
Three causes of action were pleaded:6 (1) that California's public
educational system creates substantial disparities in the educational
opportunities available to students in various school districts. Thus
the requirements of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment are not met; (2) that the parents pay a higher tax
rate than parents in many other school districts, while obtaining
comparable or inadequate education for their children; (3) that an
actual controversy exists regarding the constitutionality of the fi-
nancing scheme.
Plaintiffs' prayer included: 7 (a) a declaration that the financ-
ing scheme is unconstitutional; (b) an order that defendants reallo-
cate school funds to remedy the situation; (c) a permit to the trial
court to retain jurisdiction and restructure the system if the state
legislature failed to do so.
In the trial court, defendants filed general demurrers which
were sustained upon plaintiffs' failure to amend. On appeal, the
3. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Serrano].
4. Id. at 589, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1244.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 590-91, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1244.
7. Id. at 591, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1244.
California Supreme Court overruled the demurrers and remanded
the cause back to the trial court. 8
The right to a public education is a legal right, protected and en-
titled to equal protection and a guarantee of due process, just as
other legal rights are protected and secured. 9 The California Legis-
lature concluded ". . . (1) that young people who have dropped out
of high school, thereby failing to receive a minimum of education,
are faced with limited opportunities and employment barriers be-
cause of their lack of training and skills; (2) that such young people
comprise a disproportionately large segment of the unemployed or
unemployables in this State; (3) that such young people are dispro-
portionately involved in juvenile delinquency and youth offenses;
(4) that such young people comprise a disproportionate share of
those on the welfare roles. -"o Thus, the California Constitu-
tion provides in article IX:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential
to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Leg-
islature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.'1
Article IX goes on to state the following, in providing for a system
of common schools:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by
which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district
at least six months in every year... 12
In California, not only does society have the right to require full-
time attendance of children in public or private schools, but the law
of California grants the qualified student the correlative right to
attend full-time school.'3
Education has been found to be of unquestioned need-for the in-
dividual students and for the betterment of society. The educa-
tional institution has been found to be unique, as well:
While many of our institutions have a tendency to divide us-re-
ligious institutions, social institutions, economic institutions, polit-
ical institutions-the public school institution, as I see it, is the
8. Id.
9. Miller v. Dailey, 136 Cal. 212, 68 P. 1029 (1902); Wysinger v. Crook-
shank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 P. 54 (1890).
10. CAL. ED. CODE § 6720 (West 1969) [hereinafter, all code sections are
to the EDUCATION CODE unless otherwise indicated]; see San Francisco
Unified School District v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 950, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309,
316, 479 P.2d 669, 676 (1971) (court considered the validity of an anti-
bussing statute).
11. CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1.
12. CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 5.
13. 39 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 149, Op. No. 61-237 Mar. 9, 1962.
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one unique institution which has the capacity to unite this nation
and to unite this diverse and pluralistic society that we have.14
No court has more succinctly stated that the right to education is
fundamental than the court in Brown v. Board of Education.15
Similarly, the California Supreme Court in Jackson v. Pasadena
City School District held that education is extremely important and
therefore must be dispensed equally to all.1 6 And Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education has held that the right to an
equal educational opportunity is of "paramount importance," be-
cause it involves a "denial of fundamental rights" to schoolchil-
dren. 1
7
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Education,8 where a state poll tax
was found to be unconstitutional, the rational basis test was cast
aside, because both the classification was inherently suspect (it
was based on wealth) and a fundamental right (the right to vote)
was infringed upon. Close scrutiny was required, because the leg-
islative classifications based on wealth or property were deemed
"traditionally disfavored."'19
In Serrano, also, there was a compounding of inequities. The right
14. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F.
Supp. 599, 627 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (court held unconstitutional, under the
fourteenth amendment, the school segregation of Mexican-Americans, as
well as Negroes).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The court declared at 493:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic society.
It is required in the performance of our most basic public respon-
sibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
16. 59 Cal. 2d 876, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878 (1963); accord, Spangler
v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
intervention denied 427 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 402 U.S. 943
(1971); Soria v. Oxnard School District Board of Trustees, 328 F. Supp.
155 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
17. 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
18. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
19. 383 U.S. at 668.
to equal education was infringed upon, because the quality of edu-
cation was dependent upon the wealth of the individual property
owners-a suspect classification. The close scrutiny demanded by
the Supreme Court requires that California provide proof that the
inequality engendered by its system of public education furthers
a compelling state interest. Such proof was not shown. Serrano
concluded that California's public school financing system denies
the plaintiffs and others similarly situated the equal protection of
the laws.
[S]o long as the assessed valuation within a district's boundaries is
a major determinant of how much it can spend for its schools, only
a district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide how
much it really cares about education. The poor district cannot
freely choose to tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls
cannot provide. Far from being necessary to provide local fiscal
choice, the present financing system actually deprives the less
wealthy districts of that option.20
Serrano determined the California's financing system is uncon-
stitutional, because interdistrict variations arose from improper
classifications upon district assessed valuation-or wealth. How-
ever, the court did not reach what may be considered a more crucial
determination-the constitutionality of basing the financing of
schools on the property tax. This ultimate classification is based on
old and outmoded premises. The overburdened, taxpaying prop-
erty owners are no longer able to subsidize the non-property own-
ers' educational needs.
However, it is important to note that the plaintiffs in Serrano
have not yet won. Since the appeal to the supreme court was based
upon the sustaining of the defendants' demurrers by the trial
court,21 the cause was remanded to the trial court with orders to
overrule the demurrers. 22 It will be up to plaintiffs once more to
do battle in the court. Yet, if at the next proceedings, the allega-
tions of their complaint are sustained, the financial system of the
public schools in California must fall as unconstitutional. 23
Undoubtedly, the trial court will find that the California financ-
ing system must give way to a more equitable one. It would, there-
fore, behoove the California Legislature to begin planning ahead
and replace the foundation program before the court utters its final
order. Not only will such speed prepare the state for the impending
verdict, but it will more quickly provide equal educational oppor-
tunity for California's students.
20. Serrano at 611.
21. Id. at 591.
22. Id. at 619.
23. Id. at 615.
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Yet, the supreme court, in its divine recognition of state legis-
latures' tortoise-like speed in complying with court orders, 24 and
in its desire to avoid chaos in the public schools for the next millen-
ium, modified its opinion of Serrano on October 21, 1971, by an
addendum. The modification provided that upon a finding by the
trial court that the existing system of public school financing is
unconstitutional, the court may make such provision as to insure
"... an orderly transition from an unconstitutional to a constitu-
tional system. '25 In effect, then, California's present public school
children may some day see their children being instructed in a con-
stitutional educational system.
Slowness in complying with court orders to eradicate educa-
tional inequality is no longer acceptable. With regard to racial
segregation's denying equal educational opportunity, a California
court has set the following procedure in correcting it:
In each case seeking relief from such imbalance [in racial mixture]
the court must determine whether the imbalance is of such a degree
it affects the educational opportunities of the minority group;
whether, under the circumstances, the minority group, in fact, is
denied equal educational opportunities; and whether available
steps to alleviate the imbalance are reasonably feasible in light of
the degree of the imbalance and the practical necessities of gov-
ernmental operation. 26
The present constitutional obligation of school authorities who
have caused and intensified racial segregation in a school system,
in violation of the fourteenth amendment ". . . is to come forward
with a plan (of desegregation) that promises realistically to work
now.'' 27 Thus, integration must proceed immediately, because "...
24. Since Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 1, was modified, at
a rehearing, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), to allow the affected states to integrate
their schools "with all deliberate speed," they have been deliberately slow
in their compliance. See McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed: Legisla-
tive Reaction and Judicial Development 1956-1957, 43 VA. L. REV. 1205
(1957); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education, 436 F.2d 856,
858-9 (6th Cir. 1970).
25. Serrano insert at 618 from Modification of Opinion filed October
21, 1971, L.A. 29820 (Super. Ct. No. 938254).
26. People v. San Diego Unified School District, 19 Cal. App. 3d 252,
265-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658, 666 (1971) held that since racial imbalance de-
nies minority students equal educational opportunities and thwarts their
ability to learn, the school district must alleviate the imbalance.
27. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,
439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
continued operation of segregation is no Zonger constitutionally per-
missible.
' '2 8
Ostensibly, then, Serrano has not precisely followed the pro-
cedure indicated by the United States Supreme Court, i.e. to im-
mediately correct the educational inequality. Arguably, the re-
quirement of immediate compliance may be applicable only to school
segregation cases. However, equality through integration is no
less compelling than equality through expenditure for learning.
Whereas the argument may be made that school integration must
be immediate since the states have had an adequate opportunity to
perfect it, this rationale appears specious in view of the availability
of viable financing alternatives.
29
Perhaps in anticipating that the trial court, on remand, will over-
turn the demurrers, the California Assembly voted to change the
state's current method of state aid apportionment. This measure,
authored by John Collier (R-Los Angeles) eliminates distribution
of basic aid and substitutes instead an apportionment based on local
district needs, as determined partially by the local tax base. 0 This
piecemeal approach to revision will not likely meet the constitution-
al requirements put forward by Serrano. However, Assembly Edu-
cation Committee Chairman Leroy Greene (D-Sacramento) intro-
duced a countermeasure on January 25, 1972. His bill calls for a
statewide property tax to replace the present system of local financ-
ing.3 1
With what must be a dire anticipation of havoc in the California
Legislature while it attempts to arrive at a constructive and con-
stitutional system of state aid to education, California Attorney
General Thomas Lynch said that, as yet, he is not considering ap-
pealing the Serrano decision. It is speculative to state his possible
motives for not appealing. A valid reason might be that Mr.
Lynch is convinced that California, being the progressive state
28. Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 US. 19, 20
(1969) (emphasis added); accord, Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School
Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
29. Alternative methods to California's system of school finance are dis-
cussed infra, beginning with section IV.
30. The measure, AB 836 (1971), died in the senate along with a pro-
posed constitutional amendment, ACA 37 (1971). Assemblyman Collier
has introduced another bill in 1972 (AB 186) which again attempts to
eliminate basic aid.
31. This proposed legislation, AB 212 (1972), would increase the
amount of state aid by $584 million and guarantee an adequate support
level behind each student. The proposed tax would be $2.53 per $100
assessed valuation, increasing to $3.50 in three years. The amount of
new aid would reach $1.7 billion in 1974-75.
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that it is, would be in a preferable educational position-noting with
disdain that California schoolchildren have recently been perform-
ing below the national scholastic average.
Another possible reason could be that, considering the recent de-
cisions in other courts following Serrano, the trend is to equal edu-
cation.32 Therefore, it is likely that the United States Supreme
Court would affirm Serrano-except possibly for the modification.
Thirdly, Mr. Lynch could be hoping for a victory in the new trial.
Though this author doubts that such a wild hope has found its way
to his heart, in law, as in economics, the future is uncertain.
Since the California Supreme Court has decided that the present
financing system is unconstitutional, it is necessary to examine the
California system in detail and consider possible alternatives to it.
III. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING SYSTEM
AND ITS PROBLEMS
Pursuant to the provisions of article IX of the California Consti-
tution,33 a complete system of public schools has been established
along with the means for financing it. 34 The California system is
of a type known as a "foundation program. '35 Through the foun-
dation program-a financial plan between the state and local agen-
cies-provision is to be made for adequate financing of all educa-
tional services. The state, having a broader tax base, is to contribute
to financially weak school districts and equalize the educational op-
portunity of the students therein. The state's contribution is to be
utilized to provide ". . . a minimum amount of guaranteed support
to all districts."36 This, then, was the espoused legislative intent
with regard to supporting California's public education.
32. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971);
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337 F. Supp. 280
(W.D. Tex. 1972); but see Spano v. Board of Education, 40 U.S.L.W. 2475
(N.Y. Jan. 21, 1972) following McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969)
and Burrus v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
33. CAL. CONST. art. IX.
34. See generally §§ 17300-18460 (West 1969).
35. § 17300 (West 1969).
36. Id. The system of public school support should be designed to
strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of pub-
lic education .... Effective local control requires that all local
administrative units contribute to the support of school budgets in
proportion to their respective abilities, and that all have such
California's educational system is made up of school districts
organized in each county to include grades of kindergarten or grade
one through grade twelve.37 Districts may also be formed to pro-
vide for grades thirteen and fourteen.A8 These districts may be
incorporated by the legislature and function as ordinary corporate
bodies.3 9 Elementary, high school, and community college districts
have been established, 40 and their consolidation into unified school
districts is urged in order to insure adequate financial ability
and substantial community identity.4 1 Every city constitutes a
separate school district.
42
The two principle sources of revenue for California school dis-
tricts are local property tax levies43 and apportionments from
the State School Fund.4 4 Only seven times since the 1930-31 school
year did the State of California contribute fifty percent or more of
the total cost of education. 45 In 1969-70, the state contributed only
35.2 percent of the total educational expenditures from the State
School Fund.46 However, the state, through categorical aid such
as compensatory education, contributions to teachers' retirement,
and free text books-in addition to its school fund apportionments--
increased its actual share of total educational expenditures to 40.2
flexibility in their taxing programs as will readily permit of
progress in the improvement of the educational program. Effec-
tive local control requires a local taxing power, and a local tax
base which is not unduly restricted or overburdened. (emphasis
added).
The italicized portion indicates the basic fallacy of the system which will
become evident in subsequent discussions.
37. § 3003 (West 1969).
38. Id.
39. CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 14.
40. Elementary school districts comprise the kindergartens and grades
one to eight. High school districts are deemed to comprise all grades
nine to twelve. Community college districts are those maintaining grades
thirteen and fourteen. A high school district maintaining grades thirteen
and fourteen is deemed a community college district. § 17601 (Supp. 1971).
41. § 3100 (Supp. 1971). A unified district must maintain classes in
at least grades one through twelve. § 5013 (West 1969).
42. § 1974 (West 1969).
43. See generally §§ 20701-06, 20751, 20800-16.
44. Provision for a State School Fund to support the system of com-
mon schools is found in CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 4; see generally §§ 17300-
18460.
45. ANALYsis OF THE BuDGcT BILL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Report of
the Legislative Analyst to the Joint Legislative Budget Committee at 722
[hereinafter cited as ANALYsIsJ.
46. Id. In 1968-69, while state aid comprised 35.5 percent of total edu-
cational revenues, local property taxes' share of the total was 55.7 percent,
federal aid accounted for 6.1 percent, and miscellaneous sources made up
2.7 percent. Legislative Analyst, State of California, Public School Finance,
PartI at 5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Analyst].
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percent.47 Yet, whether the state's share of educational support
funds is 35.2 or 40.2 percent, it does not assuage the burden rele-
gated to local school districts in maintaining adequate educational
programs for their youngsters.
Presently, there appears to be an excessive number of individual
elementary, secondary, and community college districts in Cali-
fornia. In 1969-70, there were 1144 such districts. Only four other
states have a greater number of operating units.48 These districts
vary widely in their relative wealth-their assessed valuation
per average daily attendance (ADA).49 The disparity in elementary
47. ANALYSIS at 723-24.
Revenue for Public School Support
From State and Local Sources
(in thousands)
State Subventions for Public
Schools 1966-67 1967-68 1
State School Fund
Apportionments








Fund Apportionments ---- $1,094,793 $1,271,933 $:
Total Other Local Assistance -- 170,627 169,579
Total State Subventions ___ 1,220,420 1,441,512
Total General Fund Revenue
of School Districts from
Local Sources' 1,753,286 1,961,488
Total School Districts'
Revenue (State Subventions
plus Local Sources) -_ 2,973,706 3,403,000
Percent of Total State Sub-
ventions to Total School
Districts' Revenue (State Sub-
vention plus Local Sources) - 41.04% 42.36%



















In 1969-70, California apportioned approximately $202 million in cate-
gorical aid.
48. Id. at 725.
49. In California, the total assessed valuation of property in each dis-
districts ranges from a low of $103 to a high of $952,156 per stu-
dent.50 These wide variations indicate similar variations in district
ability to support educational programs. 5' As a result of the tax
base disparities, a significant variation among districts exists in the
tax rate which property owners are required to bear. The range
of tax rates for elementary school districts is from $0.15 to $5.50.52
Property taxes have soared to such heights, largely as a result
of increases in school district levies,53 that a crisis in the state's pub-
lic education may be approaching. School financing-aside from its
constitutional aspects-is in trouble .5 4 A property tax rebellion
trict is the tax base. Such assessed valuation is equalized throughout the
state for purposes of school support. The average daily attendance (ADA)
is used as a basis for state aid determination instead of total student
enrollment. In practice, ADA approximates ninety-eight percent of ac-
tual total enrollment. Legislative Analyst, supra note 46, Part IV at 2.
Average daily attendance is determined by dividing the total number of
days of attendance in all full school months by the number of days such
schools are actually taught. § 17601.1 (Supp. 1971).
Hereinafter, when figures are quoted as "per student" or "per pupil", the
reference is to per unit of ADA.
50. ANALYSIS at 726.
Assessed Valuation Per Average Daily Attendance
1969L70
Elementary High school Community college
Low $103 $11,959 $45,285
Median _ _- 19,600 41,300 133,600
High 952,156 349,093 371,432
51. See S. WEISS, ExisTinG DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 12-23 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ws'ss].
52. ANALYSIS, supra note 47 at 726.
Range of Total Tax Rates for Public School Districts 1969-70
District level Low Median High
Elementary ____$0.15 $2.25 $5.50
High school 0.89 2.08 3.54
Unified 1.00 4.33 6.97
Community college 0.41 0.65 0.99
53. ANALYSIS, supra note 47 at 725.
Changes in Property Tax Levies
1959-60 through 1969-70
1959-60 1969-701 Change
Revenue Percent of Revenue Percent of Revenue Percent of
(in inillions) Total (in milliona) Total (in inillions) Increase
School districts _ $954.9 48.0% $2,672.4 54.1% $1,717.5 179.9%
Counties - _ 653.5 32.8 1,424.2 28.9 770.7 117.9
Cities 271.1 13.6 534.6 10.8 263.5 97.2
Special districts 111.0 5.6 304.3 6.2 193.3 174.1
Total - - $1,990.5 100.0% $4,935.5 100.0% $2,945.0 147.9%
1 Exclusive of homeowners exemption and inventory exemption.
54. Cf. BIG Cn'y SCHOOLS IN A!VIERIcA: THE VIEws OF SUPERINTENDENTS
AND SCHOOL BOARD PRESIDENTS, President's Commission on School Finance
(1972).
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has struck numerous communities throughout Southern California
as an angry public, bewildered by increased school expenditures,
strikes back at higher taxes through the ballot box.55
Despite widespread support by civic, professional, and political
groups, bond issues and school tax override measures are viewed
by most taxpayers as a grab for more money. Consequently, the
rate of passage of local school bond issues has declined tremendously
since 1959, with the lowest acceptance in several years recorded in
the 1966 elections.56
Noting with concern the taxpayers' reluctance to pay higher
taxes and the increasing enrollments and cost of education,5 7 the
55. Los Angeles Times Educational Writer Dick Turpin pointed out,
in a post-election analysis, that the defeat of school bond propositions F
and G continues the trend of taxpayer resistance. He estimated that $8
million would have to be trimmed from the Los Angeles school budget,
affecting athletic programs, kindergartens, bus transportation, and summer
schools. Turpin, Schools Faced by Cutbacks as Result of Vote, Los
Angeles Times, Nov. 10, 1966, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
56. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 10, 1966, at 3, col. 2.
57. Public school enrollment in Southern California increased 177 per-
cent between 1950 and 1965, from 922,000 to 2,558,000. CRisis iN ScHooL
FnANCE: THE NixT TEN YEARS N SoumrnRN CALIFoRmA, Southern Cal-
ifornia Research Council, Report No. 14 at 18 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
SCRC]. Total expenditures increased from approximately $265 million in
1950 to $1,180 million in 1963-an astounding 345 percent. Id. at 28. It is
apparent that the per student cost of education has increased. A signifi-
cant portion of the increase in cost of education can be attributed to in-
flation. The table below shows that the California Consumer Price In-
dex increased by 5.68 percent in 1969-70. ANALYSIs, supra note 47 at 730.
Comparison of Increases in School District General Fund Current Expense
to Increases in the California Consumer Price Index
and National Productivity
(1)
Annual change (2) (3)1 (4)
in current Annual change Annual Program
expense in consumer change in improvement
of education price index productivity 1-(2+3)
1964-65 6.34% 2.20% 3.36% 0.78%
1965-66 7.51 1.61 3.24 2.66
1966-67 - 8.62 2.91 2.52 3.19
1967-68 7.43 3.17 2.20 2.06
1968-69 --- 11.85 3.90 1.61 6.34
1969-70 (est.) - 8.58 5.68 0.93 1.97
1 1970 Economic Report of the President, page 216, and the December 1970
issue of the Monthly Labor Review, by the U.S. Department of Labor,
page 96. This index refers to private nonfarm employees and the in-
creases are annual changes.
Southern California Research Council has recommended certain
guidelines for acceptable school expenditures. The council has
also recommended certain changes in California's public school sys-
tem.59
The various levels of districts' assessed valuations, and the great
disparities in inter-district effort (effort is the tax rate necessary to
raise a desired revenue) working independently, produce wide vari-
ations in district per pupil expenditure.60 Per pupil expenditure
disparities were calculated for selected school districts by the Presi-
dent's Commission on School Finance in 1972.61 For 1078 districts,
the following results were derived for the 1969-70 school year:
Statewide average per pupil expenditure6 2  $922
District average per pupil expenditure3 $782
District minimum per pupil expenditure $402
District maximum per pupil expenditure $3,187
Ratio of maximum to minimum 7.9 to 104
For the school year 1968-69, per pupil disparities in property
valuation was also calculated: 65
District average per pupil equalized assessed valuation $52,271
District minimum per pupil equalized assessed valuation $8,416
District maximum per pupil equalized assessed valuation $206,804
Ratio of maximum to minimum 24.6 to 100
Thus, it is understandable that revenues, upon which districts rely
for more than half of their expenditures, are widely varied.
In another part of the same study, seventeen districts were
selected, ranging from poorest to wealthiest, in determining per
58. See generally SCRC, supra note 57.
59. These recommendations are discussed infra.
60. Elementary districts' expenditures range from $407 to $2,586. ,AwAL-
Ysis, supra note 47 at 726.
61. REVIEW OF EXIsTING STATE SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS, DOCUMENTA-
TION OF DISPARITIES IN THE FINANCING OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECOND-
ARY SCHOOL SYSTEMs-BY STATE, Staff Report of the President's Com-
mission on School Finance, Vol II at 35 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
DocuMENTED DIsPARITIEs].
62. Statewide average per pupil expenditure is derived by dividing total
state enrollments by total expenditures. Id. at 7.
63. District average per pupil expenditure is derived by adding all the
district per pupil expenditures and dividing by the number of districts. Id.
64. The ratio within the 5th to 95th percentiles was 2.5 to 1, while that
for the range between the 10th and 90th percentiles was 2.0 to 1. Id.
at 35. At these percentiles, the extreme districts (high and low) are
eliminated, thereby affording a better measure of existing disparities.
65. Calculations were made for 168 districts. Id. at 36.
66. The ratio within the 5th to 95th percentiles was 5.9 to 1, and that
for the 10th to 90th percentiles was 3.5 to 1. Id.
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pupil revenue disparities for the year 1968-69.67 In California, a
tax of ten mills would yield Beverly Hills, the wealthiest, about
$472 per pupil; while Travis, the poorest, would receive only about
$19.08 This difference in wealth is extremely important in ex-
plaining why Beverly Hills' average expenditure per student is
$1,283 while Travis' is only $767.69
In order to equalize per pupil expenditure, calculations were at-
tempted to approximate the level of funding required to do so at
various percentile levels. The additional equalizing cost at the 95th
percentile would be $1,382.2 million, while at the 50th percentile
level, the additional cost would be $141.7 million.7 0
Revenues are attained with little effort in some districts, while
others experience more difficulty. Whereas some districts with
low expenditure levels have correspondingly low tax rates, many
more districts with unusually low expenditures have unusually
high tax rates. The latter group are attempting to compensate for
their limited tax base. In Los Angeles County, for example, Bev-
erly Hills, at a rate of $2.38 per $100 of assessed valuation, is able
to expend $1,232 per student. Baldwin Park, however, can spend
only $577 per pupil at a rate of $5.48.71
67. Id. at 37.
68. See Table 1, reproduced from id. at 37.
69. Id. Column 8 shows the tax rate that would be necessary if the
property tax were the only source of income. Since most districts receive
aid from other sources, these rates are not necessarily the actual rates
levied. However, the purpose of the column is to show the magnitude of
actual disparities among the districts.
70. See Table 2, reproduced from id. at 38.
71. ANALYsIs, supra note 47 at 727.




County ADA per ADA Tax rate per ADA
Alameda
Emery Unified - 586 $100,187 $2.57 $2,223
Newark Unified - 8,638 6,048 5.65 616
Fresno
Coalinga Unified - 2,640 $33,244 $2.17 $963
Clovis Unified 8,144 6,480 4.28 565
Kern
Rio Bravo Elementary 121 $136,271 $1.05 $1,545
Lamont Elementary - 1,847 5,971 3.06 533
Los Angeles
Beverly Hills Unified 5,542 $50,885 $2.38 $1,232
Baldwin Park Unified 13,108 3,706 5.48 577
A. THE FOUNDATION PROGRAM
Partial administration of the foundation program has befallen the
counties. School districts must submit tentative budgets to the
county superintendent of schools. 7 2 He must then approve these
budgets and file several copies with the proper administrators, to-
gether with a statement showing the amount of school district taxes
required by each district of the county.73 The superintendent de-
termines the amount of school district tax by deducting from the
total estimated needs of the district its total estimated income from
all sources other than school district tax.7 4 The board of super-
visors then determines the tax rate necessary to be levied and col-
lects such tax along with the city and county taxes."
The maximum tax rates of school district taxes which may be
levied, exclusive of bond interest and redemption, in any school
year on each $100 of assessed valuation are as follows: $ .80 for
elementary school purposes in any separate elementary school dis-
trict;76 $ .75 for high school purposes in any separate high school
district;77 and $2.00 for combined kindergarten, elementary school,
high school and community college purposes in any unified school
district. 78 The maximum tax rates established by §20751 may be
increased and subsequently decreased by a majority vote of the
qualified voters of the school district.70
72. § 20607 (West 1969).
73. Id.; § 20701 (West 1969).
74. § 20702 (West 1969).
75. §§ 20404, 20705 (West 1969).
76. In any separate elementary school district whose current ex-
penses of education for the 1963-64 or 1964-65 fiscal year were
less than twice the amount of the foundation program applicable
to the district, . . . $1.25 for elementary school purposes, or . . .
$1.35 for combined kindergarten and elementary school purposes.
§ 20751(1) (b) (Supp. 1971).
77. In any separate high school district whose current expenses of
education for the high school purposes for the 1963-64 fiscal year
were less than twice the amount of the foundation program com-
puted for high school purposes .... $.85 for high school purposes
and ... $.10 for adult education purposes.
§ 20751(1) (d) (Supp. 1971).
78. Any unified school district whose current expenses of education
per unit of average daily attendance for the 1963-64 fiscal year
were less than . . . $600, . . . $2.55 for combined kindergarten
elementary school, high school, and junior college purposes, and
... $10 for adult education purposes.
§ 20751(1)(g) (Supp. 1971).
79. Any decrease in the increased maximum rate pursuant to this
section shall not be in an amount which will reduce the tax rate
for the district below the maximum specified in § 20751.
§ 20803 (Supp. 1971). The original intent of the maximum tax rate sys-
tem was to provide control of the revenues and expenditure levels of
school districts. ANALYsIs, supra note 47, at 729. However, as discernable
from the following table, the existing rates are unrealistic, inasmuch as
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With a few exceptions,"0 the foundation program provides that
each elementary school pupil in a school district receive, during the
fiscal year, $355 of state aid, while each high school student will re-
ceive $488.81 Except in unnecessarily small school districts,8 2 dis-
tricts which are more efficiently organized are eligible for increased
foundation program aid.8 3 Moreover, an additional grant of $30 per
pupil may be allocated to school districts for grades one through
three, inclusive.
8 4
The major components of the foundation program, which attempt
to equalize educational opportunity, are basic aid, district aid,
equalization aid, and supplemental aid.
Basic Aid
Basic aid is the state's guarantee of a minimum amount of state
funds for each unit of ADA.8 5 Basic state aid consists of a $125 flat
grant to each school district for every student therein, regardless
of the wealth of the district-but not less than $2400 per district.8 6
through local option and permissive override measures (see generally
§§ 20800-16) all but a few districts are above the maximum. And, of
course, the wealthier districts need not raise taxes as much as poorer ones
in order to raise sufficient revenues for needed expenditures. ANALYSIS,
supra note 47 at 728.




tax rate Elementary High school Unified college
At or below statutory
maximum - 8 2 1 45
Above statutory maximum -730 119 234 17
80. §§ 17654.5-17667 specify that under certain conditions, unnecessarily
small schools will receive $10 per child less in foundation funds. § 17688
(Supp. 1971) provides for increases in the foundation program because of
increased costs due to inflation.
81. §§ 17655.5-17660, 17664-17665.5 (Supp. 1971).
82. § 17675 (West 1969).
83. More efficiently organized districts may receive a bonus of $20
per pupil. §§ 17671-73 (West 1969).
84. § 17674 (West 1969).
85 See note 49 supra for explanation and derivation of ADA.
86. § 17751 (West 1969) deals with basic aid to elementary school
districts; § 17801 (West 1969) provides for such aid to high school dis-
tricts; and § 17851 (West 1969) deals with aid to junior college districts.
cf. CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § 6, para. 4.
Basic aid, which constitutes about half of the state educational
funds,87 actually widens the gap between the rich and poor school
districts. 88 Such aid is distributed uniformly throughout the state.
Beverly Hills, as well as Travis, receives $125 per student. The
flat grant procedure, however, may result in some lessening in the
disparity of local tax effort, compared to a system of local support
only.8 9 But to a poor district such as Travis, basic aid is essen-
tially meaningless. Under the foundation program, the state must
make up the difference between the foundation level and the amount
of revenue per child which Travis can raise by levying a tax of $1
per $100 of assessed valuation.90 Although under the present law
that difference is composed partly of basic aid and partly of equali-
zation aid, if basic aid were unavailable, the district's revenue could
still be supplemented up to the foundation minimum-all in equal-
izing funds. To a wealthy district, the $125 is surplusage. Such
aid may either increase the district's expenditure level or lower
its property tax rate.
District Aid
District aid is the local district contribution to the foundation pro-
gram. In each district, a computational tax is used to determine
such local contribution.9 1 Tn cases where the district is located
within an area which voted down a unification proposal, a system of
"areawide aid" is used in lieu of district aid. To determine the area-
wide aid, the computational tax used in figuring the district aid is
actually levied on the districts in the area92 by the county board
of supervisors. The funds are then distributed among the separate
districts in the area on the basis of the ratio of each district's foun-
dation program to the areawide program.98 This results in a shift-
ing of local funds from the wealthy to the poor districts in the
area, and to a degree, reduces the variations in per pupil assessed
valuation.
Equalization Aid
At this time the district's foundation support program is com-
87. Legislative Analyst, supra note 46, Part II at 9.
88. See Wnlss, supra note 51 at 29.
89. Id. at 30, n.33.
90. See Table 1, notes 94, 95 infra.
91. This tax is hypothetical; it is $1 in elementary school districts;
$.80 in high school districts; $.25 in junior college districts. § 17702 (West
1969). See text accompanying notes 100 and 101 infra to see how such
aid is determined and distributed.
92. § 17680 (Supp. 1971), § 17702.2 (West 1969).
93. § 17706 (West 1969).
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puted. Equalization aid is determined by subtracting from the foun-
dation level ($355 or $488) (a) basic aid, and (b) district aid, as mea-
sured by the computational tax rate or the areawide tax.9 4 The
difference is contributed by the state as equalization aid.95 Thus,
poorer districts receive additional revenue which is not given to
more wealthy districts. Further increases are authorized to pro-
vide financial incentives to districts to institute certain organiza-
tional or program changes. These increments, too, are considered
equalization aid.96
However, since most districts' expenditures far exceed the mini-
mum foundational support level, equalization aid does not quite
approximate its name. Also, since a ceiling is placed on the amount
the state will donate in support funds, the theory behind the pro-
gram is destroyed, unless the ceiling is set close to the actual
level of expenditures of most districts.
Supplemental Support Program
In addition to the regular foundation program, the state also main-
tains a supplemental support program. Supplemental aid is avail-
able to those relatively poor school districts97 whose tax rates ex-
ceed certain prescribed minimums. An elementary district may
receive an additional (maximum) $125 per student, while the maxi-
mum amount per child in a high school district is $72.98
B. THE FOUNDATION PROGRAM AI EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
As shown previously, the level of property tax support of educa-
tion is not sufficiently equalized to permit comparable educational
programs from district to district. The wide variance in district
assessed valuations,9 9 the great number of districts throughout the
94. See note 91 supra.
95. §§ 17901, 17902 (West 1969).
96. See notes 83 and 84 supra and their accompanying texts.
97. To qualify, an elementary school district's assessed valuation per
student (AV/ADA) must be $12,500 or less. A high school district's
AV/ADA may not exceed $24,000. § 17920 (Supp. 1971).
98. In an elementary school district, the tax rate must be in excess of $1.
In a high school district, the rate must exceed $.80. In a unified district,
the tax may exceed either $1.80 or $2.15, the latter being true for a com-
munity college district under § 17601. §§ 17921-23, 17924-26 (Supp. 1971).
99. See text accompanying notes 49-51, 65, 66 supra.
state, 00 the variations in district property tax rates and its result-
ant crisis,10' the extreme ranges of districts' revenues, 0 2 and the
wide differences in district per pupil expenditures,'03 have caused
the foundation program to fail. Whereas the program was es-
tablished to achieve a minimum level of school support, its failure
was forthcoming because of its internal inconsistencies, as well
as the political fear which prevented legislators from rennovat-
ing the system according to constitutional standards.
The main reason for the foundation program's lack of success,
however, is its heavy reliance on funds raised through local prop-
erty taxes without sufficient equalization of expenditures between
the wealthy and poor districts.10 4 This resulting inequality has
been experienced by most of the other states, because most of
them have been popularly maintaining various systems closely re-
lated to California's. 0 5 California is ranked thirteenth nationally
in terms of estimated average expenditures per pupil for 1968-
69.106 However, most of these states require their districts to levy
a certain minimum tax rate in order to be eligible for any state
aid.10 7 Yet, as in California, most school district organizations
throughout the country are extremely fragmented. Six states con-
tain more than 1000 districts each (including California), while five
others are divided into more than 500 districts.108
IV. OTHER METHODS OF FNAcNG PUBLIC SCHOOLS
State aid to public education began for two reasons: to assist
schools in getting started, and to improve public education. 10
Flat grants based on enrollment or school census figures served as
the original vehicle for funding the schools. 1 0
100. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
101. See text accompanying notes 52-55, 71 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
104. This reliance on local wealth as the basis for determining a dis-
trict's ability to offer its students sufficient educational opportunity has
been found to be unconstitutional; see notes 9-20 supra and accompany-
ing text.
105. STATE Am TO LoCAL GOV NENT, Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations (ACIR), 42 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ACIR].
106. See Table 3, reproduced from Legislative Analyst, supra note 46,
Part I at 11.
107. ACIR, supra note 105 at 42; Wnmss, supra note 51 at 30.
108. ACIR, supra note 105 at 35.
109. The national average of contribution of aid by the states has been
consistently below fifty percent, see Table 8. As for dollar amount alloca-
tions per ADA by the states, see Table 9. Tables 8 and 9 are reproduced
from SCRC, supra note 57 at 46 and 45 respectively.
110. ACIR, supra note 105 at 39.
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Today state aid is distributed either by flat grant or by equalizing
grants, determined on the basis of a district's relative wealth.
Throughout the country, more than eighty percent of state aid is
provided without specific expenditure strings; it is in the nature of
junctional support. The other twenty percent is termed categorical
aid and is restricted-to textbooks, transportation, etc."'
The differences in state-local sharing of financial support for
schools can be seen when comparing the methods of state aid dis-
tribution-flat grant versus equalizing aid.112  Approximately sev-
enty percent of state aid is distributed through equalizing grants.
Delaware, New Mexico, and North Carolina provide flat grants to
cover per pupil expenditures regardless of where the student re-
sides. Thereupon, the local districts may supplement this basic aid
by levying a property tax."x3 These states offer no equalization aid.
Only thirteen states used the flat grant method to distribute at least
fifty percent of state aid in 1966-67.114 Only six states have school
financing systems which are not based on a state-local partner-
ship.
115
The bulk of states, obviously, dispense their aid on an equaliz-
ing basis. Rhode Island's aid equalizes one hundred percent. The
following states' aid is over ninety percent equalizing: Georgia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Ten-
nessee, and Utah." 6
111. Id. at 41.
112. See Table 4, reproduced from ACIR, supra note 105 at 57.
113. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-80 (Cum. Supp. 1971). This supple-
mental tax must be approved by the board of county commissioners upon
request by the county and city boards of education.
114. See Table 4.
115. Cf. COONS, CLUNE AND SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIc ED-
UcATION 148 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CooNs]. Three states are cen-
tralized, i.e. they receive mostly state aid: Delaware, Hawaii, North
Carolina. Hawaii is fully centralized, with only one school district. The
other two states finance the local districts by aid to each. Three states
are decentralized, i.e. they receive little state aid: Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, South Dakota. See for example NEB. REV. STATS. of 1943 §§ 79-470
through 79-477 (1966). COONS includes Iowa in the latter group, but Iowa
seems to have increased its involvement in supporting public education.
see IowA CODE ANN. §§ 286 A.3, A.4, A.8, A.9, 302.1 (Supp. 1971).
116. Michigan is unique in its equalization technique. Districts whose
tax rates on state equalized valuations are 125 percent or more above the
levies in other districts have their state equalized valuations-for founda-
tion program purposes-reduced proportionately. ACIR, supra note 105
at 42.
In classifying state grants as either general purpose or special
purpose, only Indiana and South Carolina require expenditures to
follow certain guidelines. South Carolina specifies the budget
categories for all of its school aid.117 In Virginia, ninety percent of
state aid is budgeted for such categories as instructional sala-
ries, administrative, supervisory, guidance, and auxiliary services,
transportation, building fund, and debt service. 118 In contrast,
Idaho, New York, Ohio, and Wyoming delegate more than ninety-
nine percent of budgetary decisions to the local school district. 119
Flat grants: A flat grant system of aid to local districts partially
recognizes need. Based on teacher salary schedules and per unit
measures, the state increases its aid funds whenever additional stu-
dents in the district create greater financial needs. 20 Delaware,
which utilizes this system, bases its determination of need on a finer
classification of students-elementary, secondary, and handi-
capped.12 ' Delaware requires no minimum effort and ignores any
disparity in local resource wealth. Although such a system would
ordinarily create tremendous inequalitiy in educational expendi-
tures, it does not create such wide disparities in Delaware, be-
cause (1) Delaware relies heavily on the income tax, and (2) its
flat grant represents a high proportion of total cost-65.8 percent in
1966, and (3) it has relatively few districts-fifty-one-which are
not widely disparate in wealth.
22
Flat grants plus categorical aid: Connecticut and North Carolina
utilize this method. North Carolina pays the total calculated amount
of salaries, transportation, and associated school costs. 23 This sys-
tem is similar to Delaware's, except that categorical aid tends to sup-
port wealthy districts where they are more able to support them-
selves. Thus, large disparities in local effort and spending are inevi-
table.
The spectre of these disparities is more significant in Connecti-
cut for two reasons: (1) the state spends less in support of local
schools-only thirty-one percent; therefore equalization is more es-
117. S.C. CODE OF LAWS tit. 21, §§ 258, 260, 261, 272, 293 (Cum. Supp.
1971).
118. ACIR, supra note 105 at 41.
119. Id.
120. WEiss, supra note 51 at 29; ACIR, supra note 105 at 42; see
COONS, supra note 115 at 52-61.
121. ACIR, supra note 105 at 42; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1702-3 (Cum.
Supp. 1970).
122. Id.; see COONS, supra note 115 at 150.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-78, 115-79 (Cun. Supp. 1971). Categorical
aid includes vocational education, driver training, school lunches, profes-
sional improvement, and educational T.V.
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sential; and (2) the number of categories-twenty-makes local ad-
ministration difficult, if not impossible.12 4
State grants with matching local funds: This method of aid is gen-
erally utilized to stimulate local effort in meeting a specified need
identified as a categorical aid program, such as school building con-
struction. The state distributes funds in accordance with a fixed
formula. 12  While there is an incentive for local districts to spend
more money, wealthier districts are at an advantage and may easily
surpass the construction ideals of poorer districts.
Percentage Equalizing Grant Systems' 6
The percentage equalizing system of grants does not utilize a
unit cost method of measuring educational needs. The system re-
quires that the state pay part of the school district's budget. The
grant is equalizing, because the amount of the grant is inversely
proportional to the district's wealth. Thus the term "percentage
equalizing" is derived, meaning that portion of the local district's
budget which is paid by the state as the equalizing factor of the poor
district.
27
Percentage equalizing eliminates variations in district wealth as
a means of determining the amounts of aid distributed. The effort
of a district in taxing itself is the determining factor. Thus the
higher a district's property tax rate, the greater its students'
educational opportunity. By taxing itself at $3 per $100 of assessed
valuation, the poor district will be able to spend the same amount
of money per pupil as a rich district. 28  However, a rich district
will have less money allocable per student if it exerts a lessor ef-
fort than a poor district. The system of equalization may be insti-
124. ACIR, supra note 105 at 42.
125. Delaware contributes sixty percent, while its districts put up forty
percent. Florida splits its share with its districts fifty-fifty. Id.; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2304 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
126. See generally CooNs, supra note 115 at 163-97; WEISS, supra note
51 at 33-47; McLoone, Modernizing State School Finance Programs: Six
Selected Areas, INTERDEPENDENCE IN SCHOOL FINANCES: THE CITY, THE
STATE, THE NATION, Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on
School Finance, Dallas, Texas 23-9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as McLoone].
127. The budget may include debt service, expenditures like trans-
portation, as well as current operational expenditures.
128. It is assumed that all districts in the state have the same tax rate
(effort).
tuted such that the individual districts have a greater or lessor
power in deciding the level of effort they will exert.
The philosophy of percentage equalizing is that local people should
support and run their own schools. 129 The objective of the system
is to make such a philosophy more meaningful to the districts by
equalizing wealth disparities. The state would pay a share of the
district's budget, but the state would not insist that the district
spend only a certain amount of money for a certain level of edu-
cation. Costs among the districts vary, and the state will support
the districts to the percentage set by the state. In order to do so, the
state will necessarily determine the districts' relative wealth. Such
determination would require the establishment, by the state, of cri-
teria for determining educational needs and numbers of students.1'9 0
Arithmetically, percentage equalizing is rather simple. The object
is to provide districts which tax at the same rate an equal number of
dollars per task unit. Disparities in local wealth will be meaning-
less. Thus a ratio is determined between a "key" district (herein it
is the richest district) and another district. Assume a poor district
has an assessed valuation of $10,000 per ADA, while the key dis-
trict's valuation is $100,000 per ADA. The formula used to deter-
mine the amount of aid going to the poor district is the following:
(1) State aid ratio (R) = 1 - local wealth (WI)
key district wealth (Wk)
(2) R= - Wk and upon substitution of numbers,
10,000
R = 1 - = .9 or ninety percent. The formula for de-
100,000
termining the amount of state aid is
(R) (Local share raised)
(3) Dollar aid (D) - which is the same
1-R
as aid ratio times local budget. At a hypothetical tax rate of one
percent, the state would pay the poor district $900:
.9 ($100)
D =- = $900.
1-.9
129. CooNs, supra note 115 at 14-16.
130. CooNs, supra note 115, refers to the numbers of students as "task."
Task is used to determine the total educational job assigned to a district,
from which the cost of education is derived. However, task may also take
into consideration the variation among districts of educational cost factors.
CooNs does not favor one of the following methods of tallying students
over the others: enrollment (first day registration), average membership
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Thus both poor and rich districts alike will spend $1000 per stu-
dent.1 31
For reasons which will be delved into shortly, the state may wish
to make the average district the key district.13 2 When such is the
case at a certain level (rate) of taxation, the average district would
receive no state aid, because all other districts (richer or poorer)
will be equalized (down or up) to it.133 For example, if Districts
A, B, and C have respective assessed valuations per student of
$10,000, $25,000, and $50,000, and B's valuation is determined to be
equal to the state average, the following ratios would result: ap-
plying formula (1), the aid ratios of A, B, and C would be .6, 0, and
-1, respectively. Thereupon, A would receive sixty percent of its
school budget from the state, while B would get nothing. C, on the
other hand, will be required to donate to the state an amount equal
to one hundred percent of the average district's budget.13 4 District
C has thus been equalized down, and its wealth advantage disap-
pears.
Thus, if each district decides to spend $500 per child, a two per-
cent tax is required; 135 whereupon A receives $300 in state aid, B
receives no aid, and C gives the state $500.136 Now all the districts
are equalized.
(year-round registration), or average attendance (year-round filled seats).
Coons 40-2. Henceforth, when reference to task is made, CooNs' definition
is meant.
131. The key district's aid ration (R) is zero. But at a one percent
effort, it raised $1,000 per pupil. The poor district raised $100 but re-
ceived $900 in aid, thus being equalized.
132. An average district would be that district whose assessed valua-
tion has been determined to be the state's average, i.e. it is the district of
average wealth.
133. This system of state aid is the type utilized in Utah. Utah re-
quires its local districts to levy a tax of sixteen mills. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53-7-18 (Smith 1970).
134. In Utah, districts which earn revenues that exceed $9,120 per
distribution unit (twenty-seven pupils) plus the amount allowed for stu-
dent transportation expenses must turn them over to the state. These
state collections are used to finance those districts which were unable to
raise $9,120 (at the sixteen mill rate). UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-7-16 (Supp.
1971), § 53-7-21 (Smith 1970).
135. Since the average district's (B) wealth is $20,000, a two percent
tax would yield $500. At this rate, A could raise $200 per child, and C
could raise $1,000.
136. Using the aid ratios derived above, .6 ($500) = $300, 0 ($500) = 0,
-1($500) = -$500.
Equalizing to an average-wealth (key) district has the effect of
spreading local wealth around the state evenly, thereby rendering
the wealth of all the districts as equal. The wealthier the key dis-
trict, the more state funds would be required to supplement the
system. This is true, because there will be fewer districts which will
be required to donate money to the state. At the same time, how-
ever, there will exist a greater number of poorer districts which
will require equalizing funds. When the key district is the wealth-
iest, the state would, in effect, be financing all school districts.
Therefore, the state will tend to prefer a system where the key dis-
trict is the average one. The choice is with the state. By choosing
a certain key district, the state can determine whether, at varying
levels of taxation, the system will require more or less state funds.
If the state decides to use the average district as key, rather than
the wealthiest one, thereby effectively redistributing the wealth,
the state may also choose to assist the districts further. The state
could award the districts supplemental aid-either a flat grant or a
percent of the budget. This decision may serve some legislative pur-
pose, such as greater state aid.
The formula for calculating the amount of supplemental state
aid is (4) R = 1 - [(W) (1-S)] where R state aid ratio, W
= wealth ratio137, and S = percent aid to average district.13 8 The
state would subsidize each district up to its R factor, and state aid
would be determined as in formula (3). However, a fifty percent
subsidy would equalize the three districts without necessitating a
$500 payment by C to the state.130  Thus, local districts would be
able to achieve the same expenditure per student by halving their
tax efforts. If the state maintains this extra support program, its
aid will double with every doubling of the average district tax rate.
However, just as in the basic plan, wealth inequality may
create problems. If the district's wealth ratio (W) is sufficiently
large-greater than two when S=.5-its state aid ratio (R) would
be negative, thereby requiring the district to donate money to the
state. Raising the amount of aid to seventy-five percent would re-
quire a district with a W factor greater than four to pay the state
and equalize. Thus, it seems that in California, where some wealth
ratios are over twenty to one, a percentage grant to all districts
W1
137. See formula (1) supra where the wealth ratio is -.
Wk
138. If the state wishes to provide fifty percent of the budget in aid, the
formula is R = 1 - [W(1-.5) ].
139. For C, R would be zero: applying formula (4), R = 1 - [2 (1-.5)J
- 0.
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could not replace the need for the wealthier districts to pay the
state for excesses of wealth.
Several other states have switched over to the percentage equaliz-
ing grant system. Yet, unlike Utah, they do not require redistribu-
tion. These states are New York, Rhode Island, Maine,140 and Wis-
consin.141 Rhode Island and Wisconsin are the only states which
have "open-ended" systems, i.e. they place no dollar ceiling on
state aid. However, the systems' equalizing theory is destroyed in
Rhode Island, because the state will pay every district thirty percent
of its expenditures-regardless of the district's wealth.142  Since
the state's participation level is just over twenty-one percent (for
the average district), over half the students in the state may fall
under the special thirty percent rule. Thus, a district must have
wealth less than eighty-eight percent of the average district to qual-
ify for aid greater than thirty percent. 143
New York's system does not incorporate the "open-ended" con-
cept. New York, however, will support the average district at a
level of forty-nine percent of its total spending; in formula (1) be-
low, it is 1-.51 = .49. This can be observed in the state's formula for
calculating the state aid ratio (R) : 144
AV/WADAd(1) R = 1- - ) (.51)
AV/WADAs
where AV=assessed valuation, and WADA is the weighted ADA, 45
while d and s indicate district and state. Apportionment to any
district for operating expenses is based on the district's total ex-
penditures and other financial data. The apportionment (A) is de-
termined below:
(2) A = $860 [ (Y-WADA) (R) ] or A = E (R),
whichever is smaller; where E = total district expenditures,
ZWADA = total base year weighted ADA (base year is the school
140. See ME. STATS. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3721, 3722, 3723, 3457 (1964).
141. See Wisc. STATS. ANN. §§ 121.02, 121.07-121.13.
142. R.L GEN. LAWS § 16-7-20 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970).
143. COONS, supra note 115 at 190-91.
144. N.Y. ED. LAw § 3602(3) (McKinney 1970).
145. Weighted ADA is determined by assigning weight units of one to
grades kindergarten through six, and 1% to grades seven through twelve
and then adding all such units. N.Y. ED. LAW § 3602 (2) (McKinney 1970).
year immediately preceding the current year), and R = state aid
ratio as determined in formula (1) above.
New York, however, places certain limitations on the apportion-
ment formula. The state will not support a district beyond $860 per
student and not less than $310 per student in any district.140 The
state aid ratio (R) may not exceed .9.1 47 The $310 minimum is very
similar and compares closely with the flat grant theory. As noted
earlier, such flat grants benefit the wealthy districts and eliminate
such benefit to poor districts, which would be compensated under
an appropriate equalization program.
By setting a maximum of $860 per student, beyond which the state
will not aid the local district, New York has, in effect, set up a
(new) foundation level. This is the second anti-equalizing factor in
its system; wealthy districts can take advantage of their superior
fiscal position and raise money beyond the $860 ceiling. In fact, such
undermining of the system has been noticed in the years subse-
quent to New York's implementation of the percentage equalizing
scheme. The following chart 148 compares New York's mean and
median expenditures with the state's expenditure ceiling for state
aid.
CEILING ON
YEAR MEDIAN MEAN STATE PARTICIPATION
1962-63 $537 $590 $500
1963-64 563 621 500
1964-65 593 669 500
1965-66 635 716 600
1966-67 680 (est.) 760 (est.) 660
1967-68 725 (est.) 800 (est.) 660
Obviously, New York is hedging in its desire for full (or at least
adequate) equalization of educational opportunity. Whether un-
willing or unable to participate wholeheartedly in its system of fi-
nancing, New York has defeated the purpose behind the plan. Un-
less the state participation ceiling is above or equal to the expendi-
ture of the wealthiest district, the incentive exists for rich districts
to expend more on their schoolchildren than the poorer districts. To
combat this probability, New York could impose a ceiling on tax
rates, thus inhibiting excessive disparities-yet not eliminating
them. Another possibility would be to raise the participation
ceiling, such that it would greatly exceed the median level of ex-
146. N.Y. ED. LAw § 3602(5) (McKinney 1970).
147. N.Y. ED. LAw § 3602(3) (d) (McKinney 1970). This limitation
detrimentally affects poor districts which cannot even raise ten percent
of their budget, thereby not fully equalizing.
148. The chart is reproduced from COONS, supra note 115 at 187.
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penditures. At this new, high level, more-yet far from all-dis-
tricts will be equalized.
A significant element in the system's failure is the omission of
the negative aid ratio, required to fully equalize expenditures. This
omission makes it possible for the wealthy districts to take advan-
tage of their wealth by raising and spending more money on their
students than poor districts. The state could somewhat offset this
development by increasing its aid ratio. However, this would en-
tail a much greater monetary participation by New York.
New York's apportionment program, in addition to aid received
through formula (1) and formula (2), includes apportionment for
capital outlays of local districts.149 Extra apportionments are
also applied to aid building on Indian reservations5 0 and for pupil
transportation.' 51 Temporary apportionments are also available to
overburdened districts.
152
The minimum apportionment to any school district, except for
certain limitations, is $304 per weighted ADA. 153 The limitations
impose certain conditions on districts subject to reorganization and
provide them with additional apportionments. 5 4 Districts which
cannot raise sufficient revenue, including property tax receipts, may
have their apportionments reduced. This would occur if the amount
which the district could raise by a tax of eleven dollars per thousand
of assessed valuation is greater than its actual revenue.'55
149. Approved expenditures would be for new construction, reconstruc-
tion, site purchase and improvement, etc. N.Y. ED. LAW § 3602(6)
(Supp. 1971-72).
150. Apportionment is the actual cost per pupil in the reservations.
N.Y. ED. LAw § 3602(6) (a) (Supp. 1971-72).
151. The state pays ninety percent of the district's transportation ex-
pense. N.Y. ED. IAW § 3602 (7) (Supp. 1971-72).
152. Urban school districts having a heavy concentration of pupils with
special needs associated with poverty may receive a maximum of $90,000,
and districts with high tax rates may receive extra aid also. Eligible
districts must levy a tax of at least $24 per $1,000 and have a weighted
ADA of at least 2000. N.Y. ED. LAw §§ 3602(11) (12) (Supp. 1971-72).
The California legislative analyst has recommended similar measures for
California districts. However, this new state aid to low-income areas will
not be temporary or based upon an "urban factor." Rather, each target
school will be approached individually and categorically. ANALYSIS,
supra note 47 at 735-37.
153. N.Y. ED. LAW § 3602(9) (McKinney 1970).
154. N.Y. ED. LAw § 3602(10) (a) (c) e) (McKinney 1970), § 3602(10)
(d) (Supp. 1971-72).
155. N.Y. ED. LAw § 3602(10) (b) (2) (McKinney 1970).
Whether or not local New York school districts have gained ap-
preciably from the new system imposed in 1960 can be seen from
the following chart of comparative percentages of state aid:5 0







It is obvious that the new system has not caused a great increase in
state aid to local school districts.
In 1968, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions prescribed legislation which would enact a system of public
school financing similar to New York's. The proposed system would
involve four phases: (1) A "basic program" supported by a county-
wide property tax and equalizing state aid. The basic program re-
quires an adequate level of expenditure per pupil of $500. (2) An
"educational improvement program" which envisions a state-local
partnership to supplement the basic program according to the local
community's relative need-up to a maximum of twice the basic
program level ($1,000). (3) A "special needs program" to identify
and support those pupils in the state who require extraordinary
funds. (4) A "state program" to provide funds to districts for fed-
eral programs which necessitate local matching funds. The total
proposed system is based on the provision of state aid to the local
districts according to an inverse relationship with the districts'
need.1
57
While studies showed that a state's switch to a percentage equal-
izing system would not increase its educational funds much be-
yond that experienced in other states during the same period,
nevertheless, in Rhode Island, state aid did increase faster than in
other states. That is, state funds were substituted for local district
funds without substantial increases in total school funds. Thus
one might claim that the state treasury was raided.168
While many states distribute equalization aid to their school dis-
156. The figures were compiled by the University of the State of New
York, in STATE AID TO NEw YoRK ScHOOL DisTRICTs 1965-66 at 2 (Albany
1967) as provided by CooNs, supra note 115 at 184.
157. 1968 STATE LEGISLATVE PRomAm, Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations 248-58 (1967); cf. ANALYsIs, supra note 47 at
732-33; SCRC, supra note 57 at 48-9.
158. McLoone, supra note 126 at 24.
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tricts, equalization is generally not reached. 159 This circumstance
arises in some states chiefly because equalization aid makes up a
relatively small portion of total state aid.160 Thus, although such aid
is equalizing insofar as it is received by the districts, it has a rela-
tively small impact on their total expenditures-especially if the
other, larger portion of state aid tends to unequalize.
Even where state equalization is proportionately a large part of
a state's total assistance, it may not be equalizing either. This
phenomenon occurs where the state bases its equalization formula
upon unequalizing factors. For instance, Massachusetts' distribu-
tion formula is dependent on a district's "reimbursable expendi-
tures" which, with some exceptions, are local expenditures from its
own sources. 16'
Another instance where the equalization objective may be by-
passed are state guarantees that, regardless of the equalization
159. See Tables 5 and 6, reproduced from DocumwNTzD DISPAPIIS,
supra note 61 at 14, 13. They depict state disparities in property valua-
tion and per pupil expenditure. It should be noted that states differ
widely in their administrative and accounting practices. For example,
states assess property at various ratios to market value. Some states
utilize equalized valuation, while others use locally assessed valuation.
And states may define per pupil expenditure on a different basis. For
instance, teacher retirement costs may be charged back to per pupil ex-
penditure. While unified school districts are common, many states have
a large number of non-unified districts. Typically, secondary school dis-
tricts have higher per pupil costs than do elementary districts. Also, dis-
parities among districts exist because of unequal percentages of excep-
tional children who need special educational programs. DOCUMENTED
DISPARITIES 6. Thus, if the extra costs involved in maintaining these higher
cost programs (i.e. secondary schools and programs for special children)
are deemed appropriate, then some degree of interdistrict disparity in
expenditure would be desirable.
In deriving Table 5, only unified districts with enrollments in excess
of 1,500 students were included in the analysis in order to eliminate the
extremes in school district wealth.
160. See Table 4. With respect to Tables 5 and 6, at each disparity
level, the difference among school districts in assessed valuation per pupil
far exceeds the difference in expenditure per pupil. Aside from state
allocations of equalization aid, another reason for this fact is that many
poor districts tax themselves at higher rates than wealthy ones.
161. "Reimbursable expenditures" are total educational expenditures less
certain categorical costs. The formula for deriving a district's aid is the
school aid percentage (where ability is reflected) times the reimbursable
expenditures (where wealthy districts have an unequal advantage, be-
cause they can more easily afford to raise money). ACIR, supra note
105 at 47.
formula, a district will not receive fewer funds than it did under a
previous distribution formula in past years.
162
Coefficients of equalization were calculated by the ACIR in 1969
to determine the degree to which state equalization did actually
achieve its objective. Such coefficients were derived for ten selected
states for a recent year. If the state's distributions completely
equalized district per pupil expenditures, a -1 coefficient was
found. The table below indicates a wide diversity in the states' ac-
tual equalization accomplishments. New York and Indiana have
nearly succeeded in perfecting their educational expenditure equal-
izing.16
3
EQUALIZATION TENDENCY OF STATE AM TO EDUCATION-SELECTED STATES
Correlation Governmental
State coefficient unit analyzed Year
Colorado -. 213 County 1963-64
Florida -. 633 County 1965-66
Indiana -. 946 County 1966-67
Kentucky -. 811 District 1964-65
Maryland -. 744 County 1964-65
Massachusetts +.024 Cities & Towns 1965-66
New York -. 918 County 1964-65
North Dakota -. 344 County 1964-65
Oregon -. 776 County 1962-63
Utah -. 398 District 1965-66
The cost of equalizing per pupil expenditures within each state,
up to various percentile levels, has been calculated as well. At all
percentile levels over eighty percent, California would have to con-
tribute the most amount of money, while Nevada and Hawaii
would be required to contribute comparatively little.10 4
School District Consolidation
Small school districts are well known for their inefficiency. In
Michigan, it was found that such districts offer fewer courses than
large districts and tend to lack provision for educating special
children. Their teachers tend to have lower qualifications, less
experience, and are more frequently responsible for teaching
courses outside their sphere of competency. Small districts are
also more likely to lack provision for in-service training of person-
nel and funds for research. 165
162. Id.
163. The table was compiled by ACIR, supra note 105 at 48.
164. See Table 7, reproduced from DOCUmENTED DISPAmUTIEs, supra note
61 at 15.
165. Thomas, Modernizing State School Finance Programs: A State
System to Equalize the Distribution of Education, INTERDEPENDENCE IN
SCHOOL FnmANCE: Tnn Crrr, THE STATE, THE NATION, Proceedings of the
[VOL. 9: 892, 1972] D-Day for Decision Makers
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The relative size of the small school districts may not permit
them to take advantage of economies of scale which may preclude
them from saving costs associated with such economies. Therefore,
while the total over-all educational program costs may not vary
between small and large districts, the large districts, with their
wider product mix'06 may be able to take advantage of economies
of scale in certain areas and thus achieve lower unit costs (e.g., per
student day costs) in those areas.
1 7
Methods of bringing about a reorganization and consolidation of
school districts will vary with the amount of information utilized
in decision-making. 68 States may encourage small districts to com-
bine by offering fiscal incentives. 6 Though several states have
sought such inducement, few claim success. 70 Mandatory consoli-
dation may also be required.'
7 '
The best reason for consolidating the scattered school districts is
that by so doing wealth disparities between the districts will be rela-
tively insignificant. The expansion of a district's geographical area
as a basis of local tax support has been recommended by states as
well as individuals.' 72 The form of consolidation most often es-
poused is the regional or areawide district. 73
Generally, the possibilities of correcting inequalities through
Eleventh National Conference on School Finance, Dallas, Texas 34, 39
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Thomas]. The optimum size of a school sys-
tem is disputed, but 2000 is often mentioned as a minimum requirement.
ACIR, supra note 105 at 35.
166. A wider product mix in a district's educational scheme means
that such district offers a greater variety of programs and services.
167. Thomas, supra note 165 at 39; ACIR, supra note 105 at 35.
168. Id.; cf. SCRC, supra note 57 at 7.
169. See, e.g., N.Y. ED. LAw § 3602(10) (McKinney 1970) and text accom-
panying note 41 supra.
170. ACIR, supra note 105 at 35.
171. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STATS. ANN. §§ 195-A:1, 195-A:2 (Equity
1964). John Gardner has advocated a policy of forced consolidation.
ACIR, supra note 105 at 35.
172. See notes 170-71 supra and their accompanying texts. The Ohio
Legislative Service Commission has also advocated an expanded tax base.
See ACIR, supra note 105 at 49. Aside from economies of scale and equal-
ity of opportunity, unification can provide more intensive use of special-
ized equipment and greater compatibility between the levels of educa-
tion in the system. SCRC, supra note 57 at 47.
173. Bronder, Detroit Metropolitan School Finances-The Revenue
Problem, 19 NAT. TAx J. 399 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bronder]; ACIR,
supra note 105 at 49.
school district consolidation of adjacent districts is not likely.174
Even consolidation of adjacent counties may not bring equality, be-
cause in a metropolitan area consisting of several counties, wealth
may be located in few of them. This is true of the Detroit area.
Therefore, where county wealth is unequal, organization of dis-
tricts should be on a metropolitan-wide basis for the purpose of a
general school program. Then, an areawide tax can be imposed,
based on the metropolitan region's assessed valuation, supplemented
by the local districts. This system is designed to work under a foun-
dation program.175 However, this reorganization was foreseen as
providing only a foundation level of $300 per pupil. This relatively
low amount of equalization means that the separate districts will
once again be required to raise a great deal of funds, thereby
destroying the relative lack of interdistrict wealth disparity foreseen
at the outset.
However, in most cases, consolidating districts on a county-wide
basis will not result in problems such as exist in Detroit. There-
fore, county-wide consolidation would be practical and more eas-
ily achieved. Here, too, an areawide tax would be levied. Mary-
land and Nevada are presently organized into county-wide dis-
tricts. Under this type of organization, interdistrict disparities are
more easily eliminated, because counties have access to incomes oth-
er than property taxes, such as personal income taxes (Maryland)
or a state-mandated sales tax supplement (Nevada).178 The Cali-
fornia legislative analyst has recently proposed the consolidation of
all elementary districts of 100 ADA or less and all high school dis-
tricts of 500 ADA or less.
177
However, there exists opposition to wholesale consolidation of
school districts. A study of the St. Louis City-County area, consid-
ered typical for urban America, has concluded that no significant
economies of scale are to be found, and that consolidation is unlikely
to solve the fiscal problems of urban schools.17 8 Such gigantic dis-
tricts would be unmanageable and unresponsive to student needs
and would cause the people to lose interest in their schools. Thus
their tax needs can become negative. 79 In any case, the real prob-
174. Cf. McLoone, supra note 126 at 29.
175. Bronder, supra note 173 at 410.
176. ACIR, supra note 105 at 49; see R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 16-3-1 through
16-3-25 (Bobbs-Merrill 1970).
177. AxALYsis, supra note 47 at 730-31.
178. Hirsch, Determinants of Public Education Expenditures, 13 NAT.
TAx J. 29 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hirsch]. Hirsch's conclusions are
based on his findings that the income elasticities of public education and
instruction are quite low. Id. at 39.
179. Id. at 40; ACIR, supra note 105 at 49.
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lem seems to be that wealthy districts are fearful of losing their
advantageous tax base and would oppose any such consolidation.
Consolidation may not even be required if high-yield taxes were
enacted to supplement the overinflated property tax in support of
education.8 0
Once consolidation is achieved, mathematical models, including
linear programming, may then be used in developing an educational
organization oriented toward equalized educational opportunity in
the state. Results from a pilot study applying linear programming
techniques to California's junior college system indicate that with
the same commitment of state funds, over $2.5 million of property
tax relief could be realized.' 8 ' This realization would not require
a reduction in the state foundational level and would equalize expen-
ditures throughout the state's districts.
Statewide Property Tax
In 1902, the states obtained 52.6 percent of their revenue from state
property taxes. As other sources of revenue became available to
them, they delegated this tax to local governments, so that by
1964, property taxes provided only 3.0 percent of the total tax
collections of state governments. [citation.] In delegating this
power, states authorized local tax which benefited school districts
and municipalities unequally. Districts with high property values
per head of population or person served received a much greater
benefit from this authorization than did districts with low assess-
ment. The state therefore created a system of taxation which re-
sulted in vastly differing tax rates, as well as in differing levels of
benefit from governmental services.'
8 2
Thus, some feel that state administration of the property tax is al-
most a sine qua non for proper derivation of local district wealth
in state aid formulas and for adequate distribution of the tax burden
between corporations and individuals 8 The tax could be raised
as in the following system.
180. Bronder, supra note 173 at 410. These taxes may be per capita,
general sales, or selective sales.
181. Bruno, Achieving Property Tax Relief with a Minimum Disruption
of State Programs, 22 NAT. TAx J. 379 (1969).
182. Thomas, Educational Opportunity in Michigan, SCHOOL FNANCE
AND EDUcATIONAL OPPORTUNIT IN MICHIGAN 7 (1968), as quoted in Tho-
mas, supra note 165 at 41.
183. McLoone, supra note 126 at 31. In California, statewide collection
of property tax would result in the elimination of basic aid and is advo-
cated by the legislative analyst. ANALYSIS, supra note 47 at 731.
A statewide property tax system could be established to finance
school expenditures by setting a uniform tax rate at a level re-
quired to meet a specified, per pupil level of expenditure.18 4 The
system would not vary from the present method of raising the reve-
nues locally, through local taxation. The uniform tax rate would
vary directly with the target level of expenditure as determined
by the state. This particular plan envisions that those districts
which collect funds in excess of the target level of expenditure (at
the uniform tax rate) must pay such excess to the state. Such
payments would later be redistributed by the state to those districts
which failed to accumulate sufficient funds at the uniform rate.
Since this proposed system is entirely locally financed, large in-
creases in the tax rate would be necessary to compensate for the
absence of any state aid-where high spending levels are desired.
Of course, the increases will make the greatest positive impact
on wealthy districts, which currently have lower tax rates. The
poorer districts, which currently exert tremendous effort in their
taxing schemes, will likely enjoy a decrease in their property taxes.
Statewide Property Tax Plus Fixed State Aid'1 5
A more realistic financing system would incorporate supplemental
state aid to ease the burden on property owners. This system
would essentially operate in the same manner as the previous one,
except that the state would supplant its excess local tax collections
used for redistributions. The state could then set a target in terms
of either tax rates or spending levels; where one is known, the other
would be determined.
A study was made of this system's effect on Massachusetts' educa-
tional system. Expenditures were equalized at the state's present
80th percentile level, and results were compared for changes in dis-
trict spending and tax rates at two levels of state funding-at the
existing level ($130 million) and at double that level ($260 million).
The figures show that when the state doubles its aid, most districts
would realize a higher level of equalized expenditure per student at
a lower tax effort.
If the state-for political reasons-decides to eliminate the redis-
tribution requirement of the system, it can do so by setting a uni-
form tax rate at such a low level, that the richest district will have
raised sufficient funds to finance its own program at the target
expenditure level. At this low tax rate, the richest district will
184. See generally WEiss, supra note 51 at 47-9 and n.53 at 47.
185. Id. at 50-5.
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not have any excess funds and will have none to pay the state. Yet,
at this low rate, local district contribution will be similarly low.
Thus, the state will necessarily be required to contribute a tremen-
dous amount of funds as compensation. At a tax rate of two mills,
the state would have to increase its aid factor by 5.8 to amass a
sum of $755.7 million. 8 6  Such an increase in state contribution
would most likely be prohibitive on many states. 8 7
Yet a study of the equalization objective of current state-support
programs has concluded that the assumptions implicit in the mea-
sures of need and ability may not be quite accurate.
A state support plan which guarantees to local school districts a
specified sum of money allocated on the basis of pupil or class-
room units does not, per se, insure equality of educational oppor-
tunity. Whether equality of educational opportunity is achieved
depends upon the nature of the educational program which is pro-
vided, not on the amount of money expended.188
Therefore, the state's allocations to the local districts must reflect
both varying educational needs and the varying educational costs
of the programs fulfilling those needs.
As the major source of school support, the local property tax
has been criticized for two major reasons. First, because it is al-
legedly a poor measure of either ability to pay or of benefits re-
ceived.' 8 9 Therefore, income and sales taxes should be looked to
for school support. Secondly, the disparity in real property assess-
ments indicates the inadequacy in administration of the property
tax in many states. In a majority of states, at least half of the local
186. Id. at 52.
187. For other New England states, the ratio of state costs in a similar
program (where the target expenditure level is set at the 80th percentile
level, and the uniform tax rate is set so low as to avoid redistribution) to
costs in a system that permits redistribution are as follows: Connecticut-
2.3, Rhode Island-2.7, Vermont-2.9, Maine--44, and New Hampshire-
12.4. Id. at 53.
188. Rossmiller, The Equalization Objective in State Support Programs:
An Analysis of Measures Needs and Ability, 18 NAT. TAx J. 362, 368 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Rossmiller].
189. A uniform property tax does not guarantee equal treatment to in-
dividual taxpayers-especially if it is true that all taxes are paid from
income. This is so because the relationship between income and property
varies with the types of property involved. Id. at 368-69; see Tables 10
and 11, which show who pays what part of his income as property tax to
support education. The tables are reproduced from CooNs, supra note
115 at 499.
assessing areas covered in the latest census (before 1969) had a dis-
persion index of over twenty percent for one-family house assess-
ments.19 ° Yet, equality in property taxation must be equalized if the
property tax is to remain a major source of school funds. A third
criticism of the property tax is that it results in tax overburdens on
some property owners and other individuals, particularly the aged
and low income groups. Minnesota and Wisconsin pioneered a "cir-
cuit breaker" technique in protecting people from extreme property
tax burdens; they utilize an income tax credit-tax rebate. 10'
In support of the property tax, two reasons are generally offered:
(1) it has been the mainstay of local government for a long time,
being a highly productive tax, (2) it is highly visible and provides
many citizens a direct link between the government service pro-
vided and its cost.
The inequality on the payment of property taxes has been more
noticeable through the pressure placed on central cities by what is
generally referred to as "municipal overburden." Municipal over-
burden arises because of the central cities' greater demand for "cus-
todial type" requirements. These are requirements for police and
fire departments, etc. Such overburden tends to reduce the amount
of funds available to central city school districts from real and per-
sonal property taxes.192 For example, a 1964 study by the Fels In-
stitute revealed that only thirty percent of local funds raised from
taxation in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh went to their school dis-
tricts, while seventy percent of suburban townships' local funds
were spent on suburban public schools.
1 3
Centralization of Educational Responsibility
New York State should be responsible for the full funding of pub-
lic elementary and secondary education in order to assure that
each student is provided equal educational opportunity and that
the quality of his education does not depend upon the property
values in the area where he happens to live.104
190. ACIR, supra note 105 at 35.
191. FRscAL BALacn iN TEAwnmicAN FEEMar SYsTEm, Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations, Vol. 1, A-31 at 22 (1967). The
New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of
Elementary and Secondary Education, note 194 infra, urges at 6 that
families which pay more than ten percent of their incomes in property
taxes should receive tax credits. The property taxes in excess of ten
percent of their incomes would be credited against the families' state
income tax.
192. See McLoone, supra note 126 at 31-2.
193. Special Education and Fiscal Requirements of Urban School Dis-
tricts in Pennsylvania, Fels Institute, University of Pennsylvania 22
(1964) as reported in ACIR, supra note 105 at 36.
194. Press Summary, New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost
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This was the conclusion of the New York State Commission on the
Quality, Cost and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion which has recently published its findings of a two-year study of
the public schools. The commission recommended that the state
discontinue its heavy reliance on local property taxes as the major
supporter of school finances, and instead utilize various other tax
methods, such as income tax, sales tax, or any combination of the
two along with the property tax. The commission also urged that
substantial increases in federal funding be provided for New York
to prevent the growing gap between state revenues and expendi-
tures.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has
also advocated state assumption of primary responsibility for financ-
ing public schools, contrary to its earlier espousal in 1968 of an equal-
ization program.19 5 The advisory commission, however, differs in
its proposed legislation from that of the New York State commis-
sion in that the former would restrict the amount of local property
tax supplementation to not more than ten percent of the state outlay
for local schools. This limitation would make more of the property
tax base available to finance the general functions of local govern-
ment, aside from creating an environment more conducive to equal
educational opportunity. Yet, the advisory commission is adamant
in requiring that local districts retain policy-making authority.
Full state funding would permit more effective controls over ex-
penditures; it would allow local school boards to spend a greater
amount of time on improving educational programs; it would permit
a commensurate growth of school quality with the state's economy;
and it would eliminate the competition now in existence among
the wealthy districts for more elaborate school facilities.
The New York plan would provide for bringing all low-expendi-
ture districts up to the 65th percentile expenditure level. At the
same time, those districts currently spending at a higher level would
still be fully funded by the state. However, they would not be per-
mitted to increase their expenditures until the expenditures in
and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education 1, Jan. 30, 1972
[hereinafter cited as New York Commission].
195. Compare ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM, Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations 16-12-00 (1969) with note 157 supra
and its accompanying text.
the rest of the states' schools had risen to meet them. Of course,
by not requiring those districts spending above the 65th percentile
to decrease their expenditures and pay their extra funds to the state,
the system would be politically palatable. Distribution of funds
would depend upon enrollment rather than on weighted ADA-ex-
cept for aid to students with learning problems. This change, how-
ever, does not take into account the tendency for secondary schools
to be more expensive to operate.
The President's Commission on School Finance announced its rec-
ommendations on March 6, 1972. It agreed that state governments
should assume the major cost of public education, and that the fed-
eral government should substantially increase its aid to educa-
tion. The commission would also restrict supplemental financing
by districts to ten percent of state allocations. The commission also
recommended increased local, state, and federal aid to private
schools.196
Hawaii is the only state which has heretofore taken over fiscal re-
sponsibility of its schools. Hawaii maintains only one school dis-
trict, so that no interdistrict inequalities could exist.ioaa Yet, Ha-
waii has retained functional responsibility of its schools, which
eliminates most of the local districts' decision-making authority.
While the commissions aforementioned insist upon local decision-
making, others are not so insistent. They reason that the necessity
of local control is based on the faulty notion that local control is
a necessary consequence of local financing and vice versa. It is
proposed that state control of the function of the schools would be a
simple and more effecient system-as in Hawaii. 197
Compensatory Educational Financing
Another alternative to the public schools' financial dependence
on their districts' tax base is a tuition grant by the state directly to
the students' parents. This tuition grant scheme could require that
governments finance a ". . . minimum level of schooling ... by giv-
ing parents vouchers redeemable for a specified maximum sum per
196. San Diego Union, Mar. 6, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
196a. See HA.w. REav. STATS. ch. 37 (1968). Chapter 37 deals with
preparation of the budgets for all of Hawaii's executive departments.
According to a March 29, 1972 letter from John A. Burns, governor of
Hawaii, there are no special laws relating to the financing of Hawaii's
single statewide public school system. Thus, since the department of
education is part of the executive branch, its budgeting, appropriation,
and allocation processes are determined by chapter 37.
197. ACIR, supra note 105 at 49.
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child per year if spent on 'approved' educational services."' 98 This
method of financial aid would promote a healthy competition be-
tween schools that would meet consumer demand for education. 99
This competition would increase the rate of innovation and would
cause schools and administrators to ". . . be less arbitrary and more
responsive to the desires and needs of their customers, the parents
and children.
'200
Such a proposal, by giving poor people the power to choose their
own schools, may permit a real freedom of choice to those who may
never have possessed it. However, poor people would not be the
only ones imbued with the urge to seek new and better schools for
their children. In fact, the poor would probably be less able to af-
ford to send their children to "better" schools more distant from
their homes. The wealthier the parents, then, the greater would be
their capability to send their children to their favorite school,
funded by the state. If the state imposes limitations with respect
to the area wherein the students must attend school, the restraint
might be self-defeating.
Another problem associated with a tuition grant system is the
likelihood of constant transferring from school to school in search
of a more suitable one. Beyond a lesson in geography, this quest
may do no more than negate the probability of the schools' offering
the students a learning experience. In any case, if the state were
also to impose restraints on the number of inter-school transfers,
the restriction may be self-defeating as well.
Aside from the phychological detriment which may be experienc-
ed by the constantly migrating students, the system makes no re-
strictions as to the possibility of wealthier families' supplanting the
government subsidy and "purchasing" better schooling. This type of
program is very similar to the familiar flat grant or basic aid sys-
tem, where inequality thrives. Thus, in order for this proposed sys-
tem to function equitably, no supplementary funding should be per-
mitted as an addendum to the state vouchers.
20 '
198. M. F=IDmAN, CAPiTASm AND FREEDOM 89 (1962).
199. Id. at 91; cf. Bickel, Desegregation: Where Do We Go from Here?,
NEw REPuBvc, Feb. 7, 1970, at 20, 22 (tuition grants to private schools
should be encouraged).
200. Kerr, et al, Major Revision of Education System Urged, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, Mar. 21, 1968, § 1, at 8, col. 3.
201. CooNs, supra note 115 at 260-61.
A tuition grant scheme, however, may be open to attack under the
equal protection clause 20 2 and under the first amendment's estab-
lishment clause, as that provision is incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment's due process guarantee. 20 3  Of course, such at-
tacks would be dependent upon the scheme's provisions and upon
the character of the schools it benefits.
Power Equalizing Grant System
20 4
The merit of a "percentage equalizing" system is that local dis-
tricts are aided according to a share of their budgets instead of unit
costs.205 However, that system would equalize educational wealth
only at each level of effort and spending. To be fully equalizing, the
grant system must equalize at all levels of effort simultaneously.
This additional requirement has been incorporated into the per-
centage equalizing grant system, and a new system was developed-
"power equalizing." This new system, while retaining the virtues
of simplicity, flexibility, and a complete elimination of wealth con-
nected disparities in local tax effort and spending, has preserved lo-
cal decision-making and control. A power equalizing system oper-
ates by making dollars per student a function of effort alone.
Power equalizing is a commitment by the state to the principle that
the relationship between effort and offering of every district will
be the same irrespective of wealth and that the district is to de-
termine the effort (within appropriate limits if the state so desires).
... Like the present system, power equalizing contemplates that
districts will value education differently and, therefore, that the
offerings throughout the state will differ. Local incentive is
stressed to the exclusion of the incompatible value of statewide
equality of offering.20 6
Power equalizing could be implemented in various ways. For in-
stance, the state may specify a schedule relating school spending
levels to local tax effort. Thereupon, if a district's revenues, at a
given tax rate, do not match the corresponding expenditure level in
the schedule, the state has two alternatives: if the difference is
one where the district experienced a deficit, the state would make
202. For a good discussion of the consequential unequal effects of using
tuition grants at discriminatory private schools, see King, Rebuilding the
"Fallen House"--State Tuition Grants for Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1971).
203. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (utilization of the state's tax supported public school system to
ennable sectarian groups to give religious instruction to public school pu-
pils in public school buildings was prohibited).
204. See generally COONS, supra note 115 at ch. 6.
205. See notes 126-31 supra and their accompanying texts.
206. CooNs, supra note 115 at 202. "Offering", as used by CooNs,
means money offering by the state to the districts.
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up the difference; if the district had earned a surplus, the state
would require such excess to be paid to the state. Thus, no devia-
tions from the prescribed tax rate-expenditure schedule is possi-
ble. All districts, regardless of their wealth, would be free to decide
their level of effort (and consequently their level of spending). Dis-
tricts with low valuation will not be at a disadvantage at any given
tax effort. In addition, in order to induce greater expenditures
and higher levels of education, the state could prepare a tax ef-
fort-expenditure schedule which would reward spending up to a cer-
tain level, with extra rewards beyond.
Whether or not such a system is likely to be preferred by the
different states is difficult to tell. It is probable that states which
currently provide aid through a percentage equalizing system will
modify them into power equalizing models. Politically speaking,
however, the redistributive aspects of the system may not be too
appealing to many states. At this point in time, only Utah has in-
stituted a system which encompasses redistribution of funds from
wealthy to the poor.
V. CONCLUSION
California's decision-makers, or legislators, will eventually be
compelled to extricate themselves from their sedate thrones of dis-
tinction and institute a workable, constitutional, school financing
program. Politicians will, however, tread softly and cautiously be-
fore committing themselves to any meaningful piece of legislation-
if not to legislation in general. Upcoming elections must be consid-
ered; wealthy supporters must be heeded. Politics plays a consid-
erable role in current decision-making. Therefore, any new financ-
ing program for the public schools will perforce require thorough de-
liberation of its political ramifications.
The political ramifications of any financing system's requiring a
redistribution of funds from wealthy to poor districts are beyond the
layman. It is highly probable, though, that the political financiers
who reside in the advantageous wealthy communities will regard
with disfavor such a "hasty" choice. Yet, this author believes that
such a system, if not bespoiled by dollar ceilings or minimum levels
of support, would equalize educational opportunity very well. How-
ever, since redistribution systems rely heavily upon the property
tax, overburdened taxpayers will remain unfairly and inequitably
in their positions.
A centralized system of school support would resolve the politi-
cians' dilemma and the property owners' plight. Full state fund-
ing will eliminate the burden of the property tax and will spread the
cost of education to the public in general. Such a system will strike
hardest at those who are most able by utilizing taxes on incomes
and sales as the basis for school support. Redistribution will not be
necessary, and no district's wealthy tax base will aid it. It is amus-
ing to note that Hawaii, the last state to join the union, has al-
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-TABLE 2-
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
NUMBER OF SCHOOL DISRICTS=-I078
TOTAL ENROLLMENT= 4682946
TOTAL EXPENDITURE= $3552.4 MILLION
COST OF RAISING PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE IN THE 5TH TO 95TH
PERCENTILES TO THE FOLLOWING LEVELS:
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE= $1075 (95TH PERCENTILE)
NUMBER OF PUPILS= 4214307
ADDITIONAL COST- $1382.2 MILLION
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE= $ 918 (90TH PERCENTILE)
NUMBER OF PUPILS= 3971888
ADDITIONAL COST= .$ 731.2 MILLION
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE= $ 828 (80TH PERCENTILE)
NUMBER OF PUPILS= 3511113
ADDITIONAL COST= $ 392.0 MILLION
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE=- $ 776 (70TH PERCENTILE)
NUMBER OF PUPILS= 3041321
ADDITIONAL COST= $ 216.4 MILLION
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE= $ 761 (60TH PERCENTILE)
NUMBER OF PUPILS= 2226224
ADDITIONAL COST= $ 174.0 MILLION
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE= $ 747 (50TH PERCENTILE)
NUMBER OF PUPILS= 2105758
ADDITIONAL COST= $ 141.7 MILLION
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-TABLE 3-
TOTAL PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE PER PUPIL IN ADA
1968-69
1. New York $1,500

















19. Rhode Island 899
20. Washington 897
United States average 895
21. Wyoming 892
22. Indiana 865




















43. North Carolina 631
44. Georgia 625




49. Souh Carolina 583
50. Alabama 484
1 Dollar amount for Alaska reduced by one-fourth ($1,421 to $1,066) to
make purchasing power generally comparable.
-TABLE 4-
ESTIMATED AMOUNT AND PERCENT OF FLAT AND EQUALIZING
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Florida _ 339.0 86.8 25.6 252.2 74.4
Georgia 287.0 14.3 5.0 272.7 95.0
Hawaii - - - - -
Idaho 31.7 .1 0.3 31.6 99.7
Illinois __ 273.6 131.0 47.9 142.6 52.1
Indiana 238.5 57.8 24.2 180.7 75.8
Iowa 51.0 46.7 91.7 4.3 8.3
Kansas 98.1 12.1 12.3 86.0 87.7
Kentucky _ 149.3 2.4 1.6 146.9 98.4
Louisiana - 276.6 53.9 19.5 222.7 80.5
Maine - - 29.9 1.6 5.5 28.3 94.5
Maryland - 144.7 27.5 19.0 117.2 81.0
Massachusetts 155.8 23.8 15.2 132.0 84.8
Michigan 507.1 31.2 6.2 475.9 93.8
Minnesota -. 205.7 48.5 23.6 157.2 76.4
Mississippi 112.9 25.9 23.0 87.0 77.0
Missouri 156.4 135.9 36.9 20.5 13.1
Montana __ 30.0 7.0 23.3 23.0 76.7
Nebraska __ 6.2 6.2 100.0 0.0 0.0
Nevada - 31.1 .2 0.8 30.9 98.2
New
Hampshire - 8.1 4.6 56.2 3.5 43.8
New Jersey - 222.1 126.7 57.0 95.4 43.0
New Mexico - 106.6 106.4 93.3 0.2 0.2
New York 1,462.0 12.5 0.9 1,449.5 99.1
North Carolina 280.3 280.3 100.0 0.0 0.0
North Dakota _ 20.5 2.5 12.3 18.0 87.7
Ohio - 327.7 .3 0.1 327.4 99.9
Oklahoma __ 74.6 22.7 30.5 51.9 69.5
Oregon - - 86.4 72.8 84.3 13.6 15.7
Pennsylvania - 583.7 62.4 10.7 521.3 89.3
Rhode Island - 20.4 0.0 0.0 29.4 100.0
South Carolina 143.5 143.5 100.0 0.0 0.0
South Dakota - 10.3 2.8 27.1 7.5 72.9
Tennessee -- 170.1 6.9 4.0 163.2 96.0
Texas 554.9 225.5 40.6 329.4 59.4
Utah - 86.9 5.4 6.3 81.5 93.7
Vermont __ 15.2 3.7 24.3 11.5 75.7
Virginia 152.7 29.5 19.3 123.2 80.7
Washington - 284.9 51.2 18.0 233.7 82.0
West Virginia 93.3 41.0 43.9 52.3 56.1
Wisconsin _ 141.3 61.2 43.3 80.1 56.7
Wyoming 21.7 3.7 17.1 18.0 82.9
Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of
Education Public School Finance Program 1966-67, By State.
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-TABLE 5-
SCHOOL DISTRICT PER-PUPIL PROPERTY VALUATION
DISPARITIES, BY STATE
1968169 Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of
Assessed Max/Min. Max/Min. W/In Max/Min. W/In
Valuation 5th-95th Percentile lOth-9Oth Percentile
*Alabama 4.5/1 3.3/1 2.7/1
Alaska 3.9/1 3.9/1 3.9/1
*Arizona 22.2/1 8.1/1 5.3/1
Arkansas 10.7/1 2.3/1 2.1/1
California 24.6/1 5.9/1 3.5/1
* Colorado 11.4/1 4.9/1 2.8/1
*Connecticut __ 5.7/1 2.9/1 2.3/1
Delaware 5.5/1 2.9/1 2.1/1
Florida 9.3/1 4.2/1 3.3/1
Georgia 4.7/1 2.4/1 1.8/1
*Hawaii (Property tax revenues not used to support education)
*Idaho 3.0/1 2.0/1 1.8/1
*Illinois 20.1/1 2.4/1 2.1/1
Indiana 17.4/1 2.7/1 2.1/1
Iowa 5.2/1 2.2/1 1.9/1
Kansas 182.8/1 4.8/1 2.6/1
Kentucky 8.6/1 4.4/1 3.1/1
*Louisiana - 13.5/1 3.5/1 2.4/1
Maine 11.2/1 4.2/1 2.4/1
Maryland 2.8/1 2.2/1 1.9/1
Massachusetts _ 10.4/1 2.7/1 2.2/1
Michigan 30.0/1 3.4/1 2.6/1
Minnesota 5.2/1 2.9/1 2.4/1
Mississippi 5.2/1 2.5/1 2.1/1
*Missouri 29.6/1 4.4/1 2.9/1
Montana 3.1/1 2.6/1 2.0/1
Nebraska 19.0/1 3.8/1 3.3/1
*Nevada 4.0/1 4.0/1 4.0/1
New Hampshire 4.5/1 2.0/1 1.6/1
New Jersey 10.5/1 4.0/1 2.9/1
New Mexico 21.4/1 9.6/1 5.9/1
New York - 84.2/1 4.7/1 3.7/1
North Carolina . 3.2/1 2.4/1 2.1/1
*North Dakota 1.7/1 1.6/1 1.6/1
Ohio 10.7/1 3.8/1 2.6/1
Oklahoma _ _ 22.4/1 4.4/1 2.7/1
Oregon 5.3/1 2.8/1 2.0/1
Pennsylvania 10.5/1 3.8/1 2.6/1
Rhode Island _ 2.2/1 1.7/1 1.6/1
South Carolina 8.8/1 3.5/1 2.6/1
South Dakota __ 9.7/1 8.3/1 1.7/1
Tennessee 9.5/1 6.2/1 3.7/1
*Texas 45.1/1 7.4/1 4.6/1
Utah 8.6/1 3.1/1 2.9/1
Vermont 3.3/1 2.3/1 1.8/1
Virginia 6.8/1 2.9/1 2.3/1
Washington 12.5/1 3.6/1 2.2/1
West Virginia 3.6/1 3.0/1 2.3/1
Wisconsin 77.9/1 2.2/1 2.0/1
*Wyoming 6.1/1 4.2/1 2.9/1
* Locally assessed valuation is used for these states. Otherwise, equalized






















































SCHOOL DISTRICT PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE
DISPARITIES, BY STATE
Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of
res MaxlMin. Max/Min. W/In Max/Min. W/In
5th-95th Percentile 10th-9Oth Percentile


























- 12.4/1 3.5/1 2.6/1
2.2/1 2.2/1 1.4/1




ina _ 1.6/1 1.4/1 1.3/1




a __ 7.9/1 2.1/1 1.5/1
d 2.3/1 1.7/1 1.5/1
na - 1.5/1 1.3/1 1.3/1







ia _ 1.4/1 1.3/1 1.2/1
__ _ 3.4/1 1.7/1 1.4/1
26.2/1 5.6/1 4.4/1
-TABLE 7-
COST OF EQUALIZING EXPENDITURES TO VARIOUS
PUPIL PERCENTILE LEVELS, BY STATE
95th per- 90th per- 80th per- 70th per- 60th per- 50th per-
centile centile centile centile centile centile
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions)
Alabama $ 50.5 $ 40.2 $ 22.2 $ 17.5 $ 12.6 $ 5.4
Alaska 10.2 10.2 9.1 4.0 0.2 0.2
Arizona - 89.9 79.6 55.5 37.3 13.8 10.3
Arkansas 49.0 37.1 19.5 15.5 12.3 7.3
California 1382.2 731.2 392.0 216.4 174.0 141.7
Colorado 65.0 65.0 65.0 43.6 16.9 14.6
Connecticut - 179.6 126.8 83.5 62.1 35.3 22.9
Delaware - 32.3 32.3 7.7 5.7 3.0 1.6
District of
Columbia __-- - - - - - -
Florida 185.1 117.2 117.2 83.5 45.2 35.8
Georgia 188.9 162.6 57.9 25.5 23.5 16.0
Hawaii 10.5 8.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.4
Idaho 56.9 33.6 14.4 14.4 9.6 5.1
Illinois 680.6 401.6 294.4 294.4 194.1 96.8
Indiana 161.9 112.9 76.9 71.3 47.9 33.0
Iowa 112.0 85.4 42.1 30.9 24.8 12.6
Kansas 101.7 69.6 26.6 16.9 11.8 11.8
Kentucky 109.6 57.1 57.1 31.9 14.6 9.8
Louisiana 66.4 53.6 27.8 17.6 12.1 11.3
Maine - _ 23.1 23.1 16.7 10.3 7.3 5.2
Maryland 175.2 175.2 28.1 28.1 24.2 14.3
Massachusetts - 344.6 236.0 121.9 68.4 51.1 42.4
Michigan 473.1 326.6 186.5 125.5 109.9 87.3
Minnesota 107.2 107.2 76.0 57.4 33.6 22.5
Mississippi 56.5 40.6 35.0 21.5 16.1 10.8
Missouri 143.0 107.1 105.8 61.6 46.2 28.7
Montana 127.0 62.5 34.8 19.6 17.2 9.5
Nebraska 79.0 48.3 19.2 11.5 10.5 7.7
Nevada - 15.7 8.1 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0
New Hampshire 20.3 16.9 11.1 7.5 3.6 2.3
New Jersey 372.2 285.6 164.5 106.5 69.6 42.4
New Mexico __ 33.1 25.3 14.4 5.2 2.9 0.9
New York 998.9 537.7 275.8 275.8 275.8 244.5
North Carolina - 84.9 84.9 42.5 36.0 28.7 19.5
North Dakota - 24.1 17.7 14.4 8.2 5.5 4.9
Ohio 530.8 471.8 256.9 182.7 136.8 79.5
Oklahoma 111.2 55.4 36.0 23.5 13.4 13.2
Oregon 70.4 54.6 31.8 17.7 13.8 13.8
Pennsylvania 456.8 456.8 351.7 180.3 113.9 62.7
Rhode Island _ 45.3 45.3 18.1 13.9 8.1 5.3
South Carolina 28.2 28.2 19.4 14.5 6.7 6.4
South Dakota - 30.8 20.1 10.8 5.7 2.6 2.6
Tennessee 88.9 88.9 64.4 54.0 33.7 14.9
Texas 394.7 263.4 144.1 92.5 55.7 40.9
Utah 33.5 13.1 9.4 7.0 1.7 1.4
Vermont 26.9 21.4 13.7 11.9 8.2 4.8
Virginia 140.3 130.8 130.8 68.8 43.3 21.7
Washington 107.2 107.2 79.3 55.9 43.3 28.0
West Virginia 31.4 30.8 16.8 12.3 11.3 4.9
Wisconsin ____ 13.4 9.0 5.8 3.5 2.1 2.1
Wyoming 38.8 27.1 16.1 8.5 4.0 1.3
Totals _ _$8758.8 $6151.4 $3724.9 $2588.5 $1855.4 $1285.0
mil- mil- Mil- mil- Mil- mil-
lion lion lion lion lion lion
-TABLE 8-
PER CENT OF THE TOTAL PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE
CONTRIBUTED BY THE STATES
California Compared to the National Average and the Next
Four Largest States Based on Average Daily Attendance
National
Year Calif. Avg. N.Y. Texas Ohio Penn.
1965/66 38.5 39.1 44.2 52.0 27.4 41.7
1964/65 _ _ 39.5 39.7 43.0 53.4 26.8 43.6
1963/64 - 38.6 40.0 44.1 52.4 25.8 45.4
1962/63 .39.8 39.3 44.4 52.2 22.7 42.1
1961/62 40.0 39.2 41.6 52.6 22.6 42.7
1960/61 40.4 40.1 42.4 50.0 29.1 51.1
1959/60 42.7 39.5 39.3 49.9 30.3 50.2
1958/59 44.2 39.5 37.1 48.1 28.6 49.1
1957/58 __44.6 39.9 37.9 48.5 33.3 49.5
1956/57 43.9 39.8 38.2 54.2 35.2 44.8
1955/56 43.8 37.7 35.5 53.0 28.0 39.1
Source: Research Division-National Education Association,
Estimate of School Statistics, 1955/56-1965/66.
-TABLE 9-
REVENUE SPENT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION
CONTRIBUTED BY THE STATES-PER PUPIL
IN AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE
California Compared to the National Average
and the Next Four Largest States
National
Calif. Avg. N.Y. Texas Ohio Penn.
Year $/ADA $/ADA $/ADA $/ADA $/ADA $/ADA
1965/66 $292 $247 $440 $283 $157 $282
1964/65 __ 285 227 381 260 143 265
1963/64 __ 267 216 375 240 127 254
1962/63 __ 275 205 351 235 130 228
1961/62 __ 269 197 308 234 130 232
1960/61 __ 215 117 297 174 135 227
1959/60 215 169 261 177 141 219
1958/59 ___ 205 158 246 168 120 211
1957/58 __ 193 148 224 167 117 198
1956/57 200 139 208 162 117 165
1955/56 __ 191 128 174 153 94 145
Sources:
1. Average daily attendance for the years 1958/59-1965/66 from: Research
Division-National Education Association, Estimate of School Statistics
1958/59-1965/66.
2. Average daily attendance for the years 1955/56-1957/58 from: U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract
of the U.S., 1958-1961.
3. Estimated revenue from: Research Division-National Education As-
sociation, Estimate of School Statistics, 1955/55-1965/66.
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-TABLE 10--
Percent of all educational spending raised locally and by state via.
property tax: selected states
Raised by Raised by
Total local district state via
raised locally via 1959-60 1959-60
State (all taxes) property tax property tax
Arizona 53.4 53.4 6.8
Delaware 9.8 9.8 0.
Illinois 67.1 67.1 0.
Nevada 33.2 30.8 3.7
New Hampshire 85.1 80.0 .5
New York 54.2 54.2 0.
North Carolina 27.8 18.9 0.
Ohio 69.4 63.9 0.
Rhode Island 72.8 72.8 0.
Utah 50.4 45.5 8.2
United States 53.0 50.3 .6
Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Revenue Pro-
grams for the Public Schools in the United States, 1959-60 (Washington,
D.C., 1960), p.7.
-TABLE 11-
Property tax as a percent of income by income level
Approximate range Resident property
Households of income tax as percent
by income quartile (dollars) of income
Lowest quartile Under 3,000 3.5
Second quartile 3,000-5,000 1.6
Third quartile 5,000-7,000 1.3
Highest quartile 7,000 and over 1.0
All households 1.3
Source: J.A. Thomas, School Finance and Educational Opportunity in
Michigan (Lansing: Michigan Department of Education, 1968), p.183.
